信危机及我国寿险市场逆向选择问题的思考
摘 要：在信息经济学发展成为当代主流经济学重要组成部分的背景下，针对我国寿险市场中大量存在的寿险公司与投保方之间严重的信息不对称问题，本文着重从微观信息经济学理论层面对我国寿险市场的逆向选择问题进行研究。
本文论述了我国寿险市场上逆向选择产生的`原因及其造成的不良后果，充分证明了我国保险业界解决信息不对称问题和防范诚信危机的重要性和紧迫性。通过构造保险市场囚徒困境博弈模型，并对各种可能促使保险双方合作的机制进行比较，本文得出激励机制是缓解信息不对称并有效解决我国保险市场囚徒困境的最优战略。本文对Rothschild-Stiglitz信息甄别模型进行了评述和借鉴，它构成本文针对我国寿险市场逆向选择问题提出的各项对策建议的理论基础。从对信息甄别模型的分析和结论中，本文得到启示：当寿险公司无法有效区分不同风险类别的投保人时，它可以在保险合同中设计1系列不同保障数额对应不同保费的保单组合供投保人自行选择，然后通过观察投保人的选择来对他们的风险信息进行甄别。最后，本文提出4种用以解决我国寿险市场逆向选择问题的对策建议，包括: 设计相应的保险契约条款、加快建立保险企业信用评级制度、保险代理人激励机制和建立完善保险信息披露制度，并给出了具体的实施方案和修正意见。
关键词: 信息不对称；信息甄别；囚徒困境；保险企业信用评级
Comments on the Good Faith Crisis and the Reflection of the Adverse Selection Problems in Domestic Insurance Market
Abstract：Facing the development of information economics as an important part of modern economics and serious asymmetric information between our insurer and insured, the paper studies solutions to these asymmetric information problems in our insurance market from information microeconomics. The paper discusses causes and disadvantageous results of the insureds adverse selection in our insurance market respectively. It proves that solving our asymmetric information problems is very important and urgent. Then the paper constructs a prisoners dilemma model in insurance market and compares several mechanisms likely propelling cooperation between both insurance sides, which draws a conclusion that the incentive mechanism is the best strategy to alleviate information asymmetry and solve the prisoners dilemma in our insurance market. The paper describes and comments on the Rothschild-Stiglitz screening model of the partial equilibrium. It constitutes the papers theoretic problems in our insurance market. Through these analysis and conclusions of the models, the paper receives the revelation: When the life insurance company is unable the policy holder which effectively differentiates the different risk category, it may design series of different safe guards amount correspondence different insurance premium in the insurance contract the chit combination voluntarily to choose for the policy holder, then through observes policy holders choice to carry on to their risk information screens. In the end, the paper puts forward four methods to resolve the adverse selection problems in our insurance market, which include designing the corresponding insurance contract provision, Speeding up the establishment insurance enterprise credit rating system, the safe agent drove the mechanism and establishing the consummates insurance information to disclose the system. In the end, it eventually has produced the concrete implementation plan and the revision opinion.
Keywords: Asymmetric Information; Partial Equilibrium; Prisoners Dilemma; Insurance Enterprise Credit Rating System
